Any­o­ne lis­te­ning to the two al­ter­na­ti­ve, lar­ge­ly non-in­ter­sec­ting, po­li­ti­cal con­ver­sa­ti­ons ta­king place in Ame­ri­ca to­day would be for­gi­ven if the ope­ning phra­ses of Char­les Dic­kens’s no­vel about the French Re­vo­lu­ti­on, A Tale of Two Ci­ties, na­tu­ral­ly pop­ped in­to mind – “It was the best of ti­mes, it was the worst of ti­mes…” 

And in at le­ast one way, the men­tal re­fe­ren­ce is an apt one. Any­o­ne loo­king at Ame­ri­ca to­day is, in fact, loo­king at two dif­fe­rent na­ti­o­nal com­mu­ni­ties. There is that part of Ame­ri­ca which has pros­pe­red over the last half or three-qu­ar­ters of a cen­tu­ry and which con­ti­nu­es to pros­per – eco­no­mi­cal­ly, so­ci­o­lo­gi­cal­ly, and psyc­ho­lo­gi­cal­ly. It is en­jo­ying tech­no­lo­gi­cal and le­gal free­doms and op­por­tu­ni­ties that pre­vi­ous ge­ne­ra­ti­ons would have re­gar­ded as imp­lau­sib­le. But there is al­so the ot­her Ame­ri­can “city” – though, more of­ten than not, not in fact a city at all, but a small town or ru­ral com­mu­ni­ty – which has seen pros­pe­ri­ty, pur­po­se, me­a­ning, and, most of all, hope dry up and di­sap­pe­ar in a so­cio-eco­no­mic drought that has las­ted now for three ge­ne­ra­ti­ons.

Two different American experiences shape the discourses

It is hard­ly surp­ri­sing that there are two comp­le­te­ly dif­fe­rent po­li­ti­cal dis­cour­ses in Ame­ri­ca to­day -- be­cau­se there are in fact two comp­le­te­ly dif­fe­rent Ame­ri­can ex­pe­rien­ces in Ame­ri­ca to­day. Where one goes wrong, ho­we­ver, is in ac­cep­ting the no­ti­on that what we see to­day is in re­a­li­ty so­me­how the best of ti­mes, or the worst of ti­mes, or both the best and the worst of ti­mes si­mul­ta­ne­ous­ly. It simp­ly isn’t. 

Even for those Ame­ri­cans for whom the shift to a post-in­dust­ri­al eco­no­my and post-in­dust­ri­al so­cie­ty has been overw­hel­ming­ly be­ne­fi­ci­al, there are se­ri­ous chal­len­ges and prob­lems which de­mand im­me­di­a­te at­ten­ti­on, ma­king life to­day prob­le­ma­tic and life to­mor­row frigh­te­ning. The en­vi­ron­men­tal ca­tast­rop­he now hit­ting North Ame­ri­ca – the same ca­tast­rop­he that is hit­ting the rest of the world – is no lon­ger a slow-mo­ving one whose ef­fects won’t be se­ri­ous­ly felt un­til af­ter we are sa­fe­ly and cheer­ful­ly in our gra­ves, and which can the­re­fo­re be left to the next ge­ne­ra­ti­on to deal with. Like an ava­lanc­he that has pic­ked up speed, it is poi­sed to smash through our com­for­tab­le re­sort be­fo­re we have fi­nis­hed our buf­fet lunch. Me­anw­hi­le, as the re­cent Co­vid pan­de­mic drove home, pros­pe­ri­ty pro­vi­des on­ly a li­mi­ted de­fen­se against no­vel in­fec­ti­ous di­se­a­ses, whose trans­mis­si­on in an in­ter­con­nec­ted world pro­mi­ses to be even fas­ter than bre­akth­roughs in scien­ti­fic de­fen­ses even when me­di­cal know­led­ge is pus­hed for­ward at a for­ced-march pace. And, of cour­se, des­pi­te fa­mi­li­a­ri­ty ha­ving bred comp­la­cen­ce, the nuc­le­ar Da­moc­les sword con­ti­nu­es to dang­le over­he­ad even while the ac­ce­le­ra­ting de­cay of the glo­bal eco­no­mic or­der thre­a­tens the un­der­pin­nings of at le­ast some of Ame­ri­ca’s post-in­dust­ri­al pros­pe­ri­ty.

So, at le­ast com­pa­red to what one might hope for, it is not the best of ti­mes. But even more cle­ar­ly, it is not the worst of ti­mes. Alt­hough one might not gu­ess it, gi­ven the hand-wrin­ging and gloom-and-doom that ap­pe­ar in the he­ad­li­nes, the Ame­ri­can eco­no­my is ac­tu­al­ly, by all usu­al me­a­su­res, in ter­ri­fic shape. Unemp­lo­y­ment may be slight­ly hig­her than it was a ye­ar ago but it is still near his­to­ri­cal all-time lows. And real wa­ges – that is, wa­ges af­ter inf­la­ti­on is ta­ken in­to ac­count – con­ti­nue to grow, per­haps not at an ext­ra­or­di­na­ry pace, but no­net­he­less at a sig­ni­fi­cant one. This is not a bad time to be an Ame­ri­can in the la­bor mar­ket. Nor is it a bad time to be an Ame­ri­can who owns some ca­pi­tal, whet­her this is in in­ves­ted to pro­du­ce cur­rent in­co­me or squir­re­led away for the fu­tu­re. Pre­dic­ting what will hap­pen to­mor­row on the stock mar­ket is a fool’s er­rand, but with ma­jor Ame­ri­can stock mar­ket in­di­ces ho­ve­ring near their all-time highs, it is hard to feel sor­ry for Ame­ri­can ca­pi­ta­lists. 

Cur­rent comp­laints are most­ly about inf­la­ti­on, which had a high in the last twel­ve months of 3.7%. No one can ar­gue that this hasn’t been pain­ful. But to put 2023-24’s inf­la­ti­on rate high of 3.7% in pers­pec­ti­ve, bet­ween 1973 and 1983 the Uni­ted Sta­tes ex­pe­rien­ced 120 con­se­cu­ti­ve months of inf­la­ti­on abo­ve 3.7%. – in­deed ex­pe­rien­cing 26 con­se­cu­ti­ve months of doub­le-di­git inf­la­ti­on bet­ween 1979 and 1981. So, yes, to­day’s inf­la­ti­on is a mat­ter de­man­ding at­ten­ti­on. But any­o­ne who thinks there is some sort of inf­la­ti­o­na­ry cri­sis in Ame­ri­ca is eit­her mi­sin­for­med or wo­e­ful­ly lac­king in pers­pec­ti­ve.

Much the same can be said about con­cerns about vi­o­lent crime in Ame­ri­ca. Ame­ri­ca is cer­tain­ly vi­o­lent com­pa­red to ne­ar­ly all ot­her ad­van­ced in­dust­ri­al de­moc­ra­cies, and is far too vi­o­lent for its own good. And it is cer­tain­ly the case that vi­o­lent crime went up du­ring the Co­vid pan­de­mic, for re­a­sons pre­dic­ted and exp­lai­ned by so­ci­o­lo­gists and psyc­ho­lo­gists. In 2020, du­ring the Trump pre­si­den­cy, ho­mi­ci­de ra­tes rose to ne­ar­ly 7 per 100,000 pe­op­le, be­fo­re drop­ping, by 2022, to about 6.3 per 100,000. Again, ho­we­ver, some pers­pec­ti­ve may be use­ful. For 30 con­se­cu­ti­ve ye­ars, from 1968 through 1997, ho­mi­ci­de ra­tes in Ame­ri­ca were abo­ve 6.3 per 100,000 – in­deed, at or abo­ve 9 per 100,000 in 14 of those 30 ye­ars, and hit­ting a high of 10.2 per 100,000 in 1980. Ame­ri­ca is far too vi­o­lent, and Do­nald Trump may be qui­te right to wor­ry about, as he put it, “Ame­ri­can car­na­ge.” But even when “car­na­ge” came to a peak du­ring his pre­si­den­cy, Ame­ri­ca was far less vi­o­lent than it had been back when Trump and Bi­den were yo­ung men.

Big picture of the transformation

The bot­tom line is that Ame­ri­ca is not ex­pe­rien­cing an eco­no­mic or so­ci­al cri­sis. It is pas­sing through a wrenc­hing, long-term eco­no­mic and so­ci­al trans­for­ma­ti­on, yes. But there is no cri­sis. Ob­jec­ti­ve­ly me­a­su­red, these are “nor­mal” ti­mes, eco­no­mi­cal­ly and so­ci­al­ly.  In fact, ob­jec­ti­ve­ly me­a­su­red, for most of Ame­ri­ca, inc­lu­ding for many in the “he­art­land” that is most af­fec­ted by the great trans­for­ma­ti­on, these are pret­ty good ti­mes.

The dis­junc­tu­re bet­ween ob­jec­ti­ve re­a­li­ty and per­cei­ved re­a­li­ty – bet­ween ac­tu­al, li­ved li­ves and how these li­ves are desc­ri­bed – ref­lects the un­for­tu­na­te truth that Ame­ri­cans, ge­ne­ral­ly spe­a­king, lack any his­to­ri­cal pers­pec­ti­ve (and in­deed have very lit­t­le pers­pec­ti­ve of any sort) when they con­si­der their pre­sent. Lac­king pers­pec­ti­ve, eve­ry bump in the road is a moun­tain and eve­ry pot­ho­le is an oce­an; eve­ry day, ho­we­ver much like the day be­fo­re or the day af­ter, ap­pe­ars uni­que and eit­her “the best” or “the worst.”

To be sure, there is, per­haps, so­met­hing of a po­li­ti­cal cri­sis in Ame­ri­ca at the mo­ment, ref­lec­ting the long-term di­vi­de bet­ween those Ame­ri­cans loo­king for­ward to the fu­tu­re and those not loo­king for­ward to it. But even here, the “cri­sis” is not of the unp­re­ce­den­ted or even unu­su­al sort – it is of a kind which rou­ti­ne­ly re­ap­pe­ars in Ame­ri­can po­li­ti­cal life, and, in fact, by the stan­dards of Ame­ri­can his­to­ry, is not all that lar­ge.

The Uni­ted Sta­tes is a po­li­ty, af­ter all, in which deep po­li­ti­cal di­vi­si­on and nas­ty par­ti­san rhe­to­ric is the norm, not the ex­cep­ti­on. Dra­wing on the his­to­ry of Gree­ce, Rome, and the Ame­ri­can sta­tes them­sel­ves, the Foun­ders – that is, the aut­hors of the U.S. Cons­ti­tu­ti­on – re­a­so­ned that a stab­le li­be­ral de­moc­ra­cy re­qui­red ma­xi­mum so­ci­al, eco­no­mic, and, yes, po­li­ti­cal di­ver­si­ty in or­der to sur­vi­ve. Un­less men were mi­ra­cu­lous­ly to be­co­me an­gels, Ja­mes Ma­di­son exp­lai­ned, on­ly in high­ly he­te­ro­ge­ne­ous so­cie­ties could li­be­ra­lism stab­ly co-exist with de­moc­ra­cy. Hen­ce, the need for a lar­ge, di­ver­se, he­te­ro­ge­nous Ame­ri­can re­pub­lic. But (and this the Foun­ders saw, too!), the ma­xi­mal di­ver­si­ty ne­ces­sa­ry for a li­be­ral de­moc­ra­tic re­pub­lic’s sur­vi­val would al­so, un­for­tu­na­te­ly, mean the re­pub­lic would face cons­tant in­ter­nal di­vi­si­ons and would rou­ti­ne­ly ap­pe­ar to be on the brink of po­li­ti­cal rup­tu­re or col­lap­se. 

Will the upcoming election determine the future of American politics?

Step­ping back from this “big pic­tu­re” over­view, ho­we­ver, the im­me­di­a­te qu­es­ti­on we would all like ans­we­red is what this all me­ans for the elec­ti­ons this co­ming No­vem­ber. Who is going to win? The doom-and-gloom re­ac­ti­o­na­ries?  Or the per­pe­tu­al­ly op­ti­mis­tic prog­res­si­ves? Reg­ret­tab­ly, that is a qu­es­ti­on that no one yet has an ans­wer to. The race cur­rent­ly looks to be inc­re­dib­ly close. Any­o­ne of­fe­ring con­fi­dent pre­dic­ti­ons eit­her owns a crys­tal ball not avai­lab­le to mere mor­tals or is a char­la­tan.

Four points are no­net­he­less worth ma­king. The first is that while over a four-ye­ar or eight-ye­ar time ho­ri­zon, who wins this elec­ti­on may make a dif­fe­ren­ce for Ame­ri­cans, in the lon­ger term it re­al­ly won’t. In the lon­ger term, the eco­no­mic and so­ci­al for­ces rep­re­sen­ted by Har­ris and Walz will win. The Uni­ted Sta­tes will con­ti­nue to tran­si­ti­on to a post-in­dust­ri­al eco­no­my and post-in­dust­ri­al so­cie­ty. The parts of Ame­ri­can so­cie­ty that will die away in this tran­si­ti­on will, re­gard­less of who wins in 2024, con­ti­nue to die away. For bet­ter and for wor­se, their com­mu­ni­ties will evol­ve. Anot­her four or eight ye­ars of Re­pub­li­can cont­rol of the White Hou­se might mean that the “stic­kiest,” le­ast ea­si­ly chan­ged of Ame­ri­ca’s po­li­ti­cal ins­ti­tu­ti­ons – the Sup­re­me Court – will be back­ward-loo­king and will hold back the flow of the ri­ver for re­la­ti­ve­ly lon­ger, but not­hing that hap­pens in No­vem­ber 2024 will chan­ge the di­rec­ti­on the ri­ver is flo­wing.

The se­cond point is that even in the short run, who wins will have less im­pact than most Ame­ri­cans as­su­me. Neit­her the prog­res­si­ves nor the re­ac­ti­o­na­ries have a plan that will sig­ni­fi­cant­ly speed or slow the tran­si­ti­on to a post-in­dust­ri­al Ame­ri­ca. In fact, iro­ni­cal­ly, a Trump vic­to­ry might make the pro­cess of chan­ge even more pain­ful for his po­li­ti­cal base. The an­ti­pat­hy that both Trump and his po­li­ti­cal sup­por­ters have to­ward “big go­vern­ment” and “the bu­re­auc­ra­tic state” are li­ke­ly to make it more, not less, dif­fi­cult for the go­vern­ment to take steps to pre­ser­ve those ele­ments of ru­ral and small-town Ame­ri­ca that could in fact be pre­ser­ved.

The third is that Tim Walz is right: even by the stan­dards of Ame­ri­can po­li­tics, Do­nald Trump and JD Van­ce re­al­ly are (as Walz puts it) de­ci­ded­ly “weird.” Wha­te­ver one thinks of Trump/Van­ce po­li­cies, their grasp on re­a­li­ty seems at ti­mes a bit weak. Walz and his run­ning mate, Ka­ma­la Har­ris, are, at ral­lies and in photo ops, cons­tant­ly smi­ling. Per­haps there isn’t as much to smile about as they seem to think. But Trump’s and Van­ce’s view of Ame­ri­ca’s pre­sent and fu­tu­re con­di­ti­ons – a view which le­ads them to per­pe­tu­al­ly scowl – is simp­ly cuc­koo crazy. Child­less, sing­le wo­men (who may or may not own cats) turn out to be qui­te ab­le to live me­a­ning­ful, ful­fil­ling li­ves, and are not ne­ces­sa­ri­ly dried-up, bit­ter in­di­vi­du­als who hate Ame­ri­ca. There are re­a­sons for post-me­no­pau­sal wo­men to exist be­si­des to care for grandc­hild­ren. Cont­ra­ry to the cons­pi­ra­cy the­o­ries cir­cu­la­ting among MAGA sup­por­ters, many pro­fes­si­o­nal lib­ra­ri­ans are not, in fact, “groo­mers” trying to pre­pa­re child­ren for mo­les­ta­ti­on. Des­pi­te Trump’s claims, the re­a­son that most Cent­ral Ame­ri­can mig­rants are see­king ent­ry to the Uni­ted Sta­tes is not so that they can rape Ame­ri­can wo­men. And Vla­di­mir Pu­tin is not any re­a­so­nab­le per­son’s idea of a nice man.

This last ob­ser­va­ti­on sug­gests a fourth and fi­nal point, one that is in fact troub­ling. Even if the elec­ti­on of 2024 mat­ters less than one might as­su­me when it co­mes to Ame­ri­ca’s do­mes­tic po­li­cies and long-run fu­tu­re, the elec­ti­on will mat­ter ful­ly as much as ob­ser­vers as­su­me when it co­mes to Ame­ri­ca’s fo­reign po­li­cy. Ame­ri­ca will do fine no mat­ter who wins. The rest of the world, ho­we­ver, has more re­a­son for con­cern.

***

Ed­ward Rho­des is a pro­fes­sor of Go­vern­ment and In­ter­na­ti­o­nal Af­fairs at Ge­or­ge Ma­son Uni­ver­si­ty. Rho­des is best known for his re­se­arch in­to the phi­lo­sop­hi­cal and cul­tu­ral roots of Ame­ri­can fo­reign and na­ti­o­nal se­cu­ri­ty po­li­cy. Rho­des ser­ved for six ye­ars on the U.S. State De­part­ment’s Ad­vi­so­ry Com­mit­tee on His­to­ri­cal Dip­lo­ma­tic Do­cu­men­ta­ti­on, the Cong­res­si­o­nal­ly man­da­ted, non­par­ti­san body that re­views and cer­ti­fies the of­fi­ci­al, pub­lis­hed ac­count of Ame­ri­can fo­reign po­li­cy for comp­le­te­ness and ac­cu­ra­cy.